Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1971

Elizabeth Frandsen Trinnaman and Cheryl Frandsen Griffiths v.
Edith S. Clinger and Herschel J. Clinger : Appellant's Petition For
Rehearing

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.R.M. Child and James L. WIlde; Attorneys for Appellants
Recommended Citation
Petition for Rehearing, Trinnaman v. Clinger, No. 12302 (1971).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/5364

This Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

INDEX

Cases Cited

Page

Aronson v. Bank of America Natl. Trust,
42 Cal. App. 2d 710, 109 P .2d 1001

2

Frederick :May & Co. v. Dunn, 13 U.2d 40,
368 P.2d 266 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

In re Sheehan's Estate 290 Ill. App. 551,
9 N.E.2d 63 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

Singleton v. Alexander, 19 U.2d 292,
431 P.2d 126 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

Statutes and A nthorities Cited
75-10-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 . . . . . . . . . .

5

78-12-20, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 . . . . . . . . . .

5

86 A.L.R. 2d 970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

6 :Moore's Federal Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
ELIZABETH FRANDSEN TRINNAl\lAN and CHERYL FRANDSEN GRIFFITHS,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
-vs-

Case No.
12302

EDITH S. CLINGER and
HERSCHEL J. CLINGER,
Dfendants and

Appellants' Petition For Rehearing
Plaintiffs and appellants respectfully petition this
I-Ionorable Court for a rehearing and reargument in the
above entitled case.
'l'he opinion of the Court apparently mistakenly
assumes that the plaintiffs and appellants were grandchildren of the deceased and perhaps took through their
father. If the father as their guardian was then barred
by the statute of limitations, the Court would be correct
in holding the persons who take from or through the
guardian to be likewise barred.
However, the facts in this case were that the plaintiffs and appellants were the only children of the de-
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ceased and the sole residuary legatees under circumstances that the executrix was also named and acted as
trustee of the residue of the estate property to which
the minor children were entitled, until they became of
age. The father-natural guardian-subsequently appointed general guardian, never possesed nor had the
right to possesion or custody of said property-theref ore, he had no cause of action against the executrix and
no statute of limitation would come into effect against
him. 86 A.L.R.2d 970, § 5 ( 1962); In re Sheehan's
Estate, 290 Ill. App. 551, 9 N .E.2d 63 ( 1937) ; Aronson v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association, 42 Cal. App.2d 710, 109 P.2d 1001 (1914).
The opinion of the court holds that "where the statute
of limitations had run against their guardian, the minor
heirs are likewise uarred." Under the facts of this case, '
the guardian never had a cause of action against the ex- i
ecutrix against which a statute of limitation could run.
The opinion of the Court finds:
"The sale confirmed by the court \vas without
any concealment, misrepresentations, deception or fraud since there was a full disclosure
of the facts pertaining to the relationship of
the executrix and purchaser, that the executrix owned the other undivided one-half interest in the property sold, . . . and that the
fa th er and natural guardian of the pb.intif fs
who were then minors, was on notice of the
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sale, and in fact encouraged the sale so as to
obtain his curtesy interest."
Appellant respectfully contends the above fin<lings are manifestly against the weight of the evidence.
The assertion that the father encouraged the sale for
his curtesy advantage is wholly unsupported by the record. The plain language of the Order of Confirmation
(Il.46) at its minimum raises clear inference that the
Court was not aware of the fact that the executrixtrustee held the property as a tenant in common with
the decedent. The language of Petition for Confirmation did not Jisdose the relationship of the executrix
and her husband (R.46) nor was it disclosed in the contract of purchase and a clear inference arises that there
was no disclosure."
It appears in these issues that this Court weighed
and made findings of disputed, material issues of fact .
.A. ppellant respectfully contends the Court should not
hnve done so on an appeal from a Summary Judgment.
In Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P.2d
l :?f> ( 1967) this Court held:
"It will be notecl that a summary judgment
can be granted only when it is shown that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party also is entitled to judgment as a matter of law under those facts.
The court cannot consider the u:eight of testimony or the credibility of witnesses in considering a motion for tmrnrnary jndgrnent. He
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simply determines that there is no disputed
issue of material fact and that as a matter of
law a party should prevail." 19 Utah 2d at
294. (Emphasis added.)
See also 6 lVIoore's Federal Practice, § 56.15 [8],
p. 2440 ( 1965).
This Court has also held that in a Motion for a
Summary Judgment, all inferences are to be viewed
favorable to the unsuccessful party. In Frederick May
& Co. v. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P.2d 266 (1962)
this Court in di ca ted :
"To sustain a summary judgment, the pleadings, evidence, admissions and inferences
therefrom, viewed most favorably to the loser,
must show that there is no genuine issue of
material fact, and that the winner is entitle(l
to a judgment as a matter of law. Such showing must preclude, as a matter of law, all
reasonable possibility that the loser could win
if given a trial." 13 Utah 2d at 42-43.
Appellants submit that the opinion of this Court
\veighed the evidence and drew inferences adversely to
appelhnt, the non-prevailing party below. This should
not have been done in an appeal from a summary judg- ,
ment proceeding.
T'he unfortunate result of the Court's opinion appears to appellants to he that it may he cited in support
of the following propositions:
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1.

A trustee may deal with himself if he pays

value.
An executor, notwithstanding the unambiguous
language of Section 75-10-6, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, may indirect 1 y purchase property of
the estate entrusted to him and may be interested in
the sale, provided only that he make disclosure and pay
value (it being again re-emphasized that appellant denies disclosure was made) .
2.

A minor having a general guardian loses the
rights accorded to minors by Section 78-12-20, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, to have the statute of limitations tolled during the period of his minority.
3.

It is submitted that the foregoing propositions
should not be the law of the State of Utah, and if thev
are not, this Court should rule in favor of appellants
and set asicle the Summary Judgment granted by the

lower court.
Respectfully subm.itted,

R. l\L CHILD and

JAMES L. 'VILDE for
RAY, QUINNEY &
NEBEKER
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and A ppellant.<t

